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## Translating the ‘European Charter for Researchers and the Code of Conduct for the Recruitment of Researchers’ in national arenas: Norway vs Spain

**Meng-Hsuan Chou and José Real-Dato**

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### **Introduction**

Researcher mobility is a central pillar of the European Research Area (ERA) and this chapter examines the main instrument formally adopted for its promotion: ‘The European Charter for Researchers and the Code of Conduct for the Recruitment of Researchers’ (European Commission 2005). The Charter and the Code (CC), as the name implies, is a set of 40 principles outlining the rights, duties and obligations of researchers, their employers and funders. In essence, the CC lays the foundation on which a more detailed human resource (HR) policy for researchers could be elaborated. The general idea is that, with the CC acting as a baseline for an HR policy, Europe would become a more attractive destination for research.

The CC is a non-binding instrument. The Commission of the European Union (EU) adopted it in 2005 and, while some 170 institutions representing 19 countries endorsed it by 2006, its implementation was considered ‘slow’ (European Commission

2007, p. 4). According to an external evaluation carried out for the European Commission, a fundamental problem concerned a general lack of awareness of the CC amongst researchers even within those institutions that formally endorsed it (European Commission 2009, p. 25). This led the European Commission to launch the ‘Human Resource Strategy for Researchers’ (HRSR) in 2008 to assist institutions in the implementation of the CC at the national and institutional levels. Four cohorts (each consisting of 40–50 institutions) have joined the HRSR as of 2014. While participation in the HRSR is also voluntary, institutions do devote resources (organizational, financial and manpower) to meet the targets set and to prepare for multiple (internal and external) evaluations of their progress.

By studying the implementation of the CC, this chapter deals with a basic puzzle concerning voluntary policy instruments: why comply? More specifically, why do actors voluntarily implement non-binding EU measures that could contribute to changing existing (institutionalized) procedures, rules and practices? It is important to address this question in light of how increasingly complex EU governance has become in recent decades in which a panoply of binding as well as non-binding measures across different policy domains are adopted to affect similar outcomes. By explaining why research organizations would voluntarily implement measures originating from the supranational level in contested policy sectors, we consider whether integration could only move forward when legally binding measures are the *modus operandi*. Taking the CC as a case study and, following the literature on compliance, we identify the rationales and organizational features enabling research institutions to endorse and translate non-binding instruments into their internal regulations.

To do so, this chapter is structured as follows. We begin by discussing the CC within the context of the ERA to identify the career management framework it promotes and its main supporters and opponents. For this purpose, we use official documents to which we have had access. Next, given our main research interest resides in explaining why organizations agree to adopt and, eventually, to translate non-obligatory measures into their internal working, we review the literature on compliance in the fields of EU studies and international relations – those where the subject of *compliance* has received a more exhaustive treatment – to distil a number of explanatory arguments for structuring the empirical section, where we present the research design and findings. We conclude with a systematic interpretation of our results in light of the explanations highlighted in the compliance literature.

### **A pan-European human resource policy for researchers: the Charter and the Code**

The CC proposes a career management framework that holds the researchers and their employers or funders equally responsible. The Charter, divided into two parts (see Table 3.1), is concerned with professional responsibilities of researchers and the working environment. The Code, on the other hand, sets out nine principles (plus one additional principle that we consider important) that recruiters should follow when selecting researchers (see Table 3.2). The CC can be seen as ‘standards’, a form of regulation consisting of ‘pieces of general advice offered to large number of potential adopters’ to be incorporated in their internal working on a voluntary basis (Brunsson and Jacobsson 2000a, p. 2). Unlike norms, standards are ‘written’, ‘explicit and have an evident source’ and presumably not yet internalized; unlike directives’, or rules, in the sense of

Ostrom (2005), they ‘are claimed to be voluntary’ because those ‘who issue standards are unable or unwilling to make others follow them’ (ibid., p. 13).

[Table 3.1 about here]

[Table 3.2 about here]

The idea for the CC could be traced back to the pre-ERA years (see Chou 2012, p. 1060), but it was the formal launch of the ERA concept that pushed the issue of a ‘mobile’ and ‘knowledgeable’ workforce onto the agenda in this domain. In its 2001 Communication titled ‘A Mobility Strategy for the European Research Area’ (European Commission 2001), the European Commission argued for why a ‘special approach’ to the free movement of researchers was necessary and set out recommendations on how to achieve this goal. This was followed up by another Communication in 2003: ‘Researchers in the European Research Area: One Profession, Multiple Careers’ (European Commission 2003). In this Communication, the European Commission announced that it would soon launch the process to develop a “‘European Researcher’s Charter”, a framework for the career management for human resources in R&D’ and to outline the “‘Code of conduct for the recruitment of researchers” based on best practice, to improve recruitment methods’ (ibid., p. 23).

The CC is a ‘product’ of a European Commission-driven process involving both stakeholder and (ad hoc) expert groups; in this way, the preparation of the CC can be seen as both a top-down and bottom-up process. To start, the European Commission solicited inputs from various stakeholder groups: the research community (for example EuroScience and the Marie Curie Fellows Association) and trade unions

(EUROCADRES and ETUCE). Young researchers also had multiple roles in drafting the CC: they gave inputs indirectly (via consultation) as well as directly through their membership in the External Advisory Group for the Marie Curie Actions (now the People's Programme) and the dedicated working group within the Steering Group on Human Resources and Mobility where the CC was finalized (Quintanilha 2004). With the exception of EU Presidencies, member states (through their national delegates sitting in the Council of Ministers configuration) played a minor role in comparison to those they have had in other policy sectors such as security and migration, yet the framing of the CC as a 'recommendation to the member states' suggested that they were the intended primary audience – the 'adopters' (Brunsson and Jacobsson 2000a) – for implementing these standards. As we shall see, however, governmental actors showed very little interest in doing so.

In 2005, several initiatives were launched to promote the CC. For instance, the European Commission, with the support of national research ministries and Rectors' conferences (heads of higher education institutions), convened several CC seminars throughout Europe. The European Researcher's Mobility Portal, now known as Euraxess, actively promoted the CC and continues to do so to this day (European Commission 2006, p. 7). The UK Presidency hosted a conference on the CC in September 2005. Here, the participants optimistically stated that 'the Charter and Code itself is not the end of the process, but rather the beginning of a shift in perception at the European level of an understanding of research and the talented individuals that carry it out' (Kane 2005, p. 3). By the end of 2005, several national research organizations endorsed the CC or signalled their intentions to do so very shortly; yet only Lithuania

had formally implemented the CC into national legislation (European Commission 2006, pp. 8–12).

The Austrian Presidency of the EU convened another conference on the CC in the first half of 2006. The theme revolved around how the CC could act as the driver for enhancing career prospects. One of its main conclusions stressed the ‘voluntary’ nature of the CC, noting that implementing these principles ‘does not mean [applying] every single word’ (Austrian Presidency of the EU 2006, p. 2). At the same time, the participants stressed that the CC implementation should be a transparent one and proposed that a ‘label’ be introduced to differentiate institutions implementing the CC from those who were not. Some academic participants, however, commented on how the CC principles could potentially require substantive changes to the existing practices at some national institutions (*ibid.*, see Ramón Marimón’s speech). On balance, what can be concluded from the official documents and statements is that, while reception was warm amongst the national actors (endorsement increased steadily during the first years), there was very little formal translation by governments – the intended audience (European Commission 2009, pp. 25–26).

In 2008, the European Commission renewed its efforts to promote the implementation of the CC by launching the HRSR. This represented a shift in the European Commission’s strategy, as the HRSR is devised to stimulate voluntary compliance at the level of research funding agencies, universities and research institutes. Consisting of five steps, the participating institutions begin with Step 1 by carrying out internal analyses to identify differences between internal practice and those described in the CC (a so-called gap analysis). In these analyses, institutions should identify ‘actions required’ that would allow them to improve the situation. In Step 2, the institutions

upload these gap analyses to their institutional webpage and also to Euraxess. The European Commission examines the gap analyses at Step 3; it either ‘approves’ or suggests ways to improve. If the European Commission ‘approves’, then a logo signifying ‘HR Excellence in Research’ is awarded to the institution. This logo can then be freely used in all institutional communications (virtually and in print). To retain logo usage, the institutions must carry out a self-evaluation every two years and have an external evaluation every four years (Steps 4 and 5).

Between 2009 and 2013, the European Commission has offered guidance and support to organizations belonging to one of the four successive cohorts participating in the HRS4R. Currently, over 120 institutions are participating in the HRS4R and over 65 have achieved ‘logo’ status (ERA-SGHRM Working Group 2012). In light of the response from national governmental actors towards implementing the CC, this development indicates that some organizations have shown greater interest in the CC. This is particularly interesting given that participation in the HRS4R occurred during one of the most difficult economic crises Europe has faced in recent decades. Indeed, higher education institutions have been especially affected by recent cuts in public spending (see Hoareau 2014, this volume).

Given these developments, we ask: why did organizations decide to endorse and translate the CC at times of institutional resource scarcity? In asking this question, we differentiate between the ‘transposition’ and ‘enforcement/application’ stages in the process of implementing EU measures (on the different stages of implementing EU regulations, see Treib 2008, p. 6). Here, we are interested in the ‘transposition’ stage – that is, in the case of the CC, when national organizations adopt voluntary EU standards into internal rules. In this respect, we focus on three types of ‘outputs’ or ‘organizational

behaviour' related to the translation of the CC into internal public policy or organizational rules: endorsement (that is, manifesting support and agreement for the CC principles through the actual signing of an endorsement letter as declaration of support); participating in the HRS4R process; and securing the HRS4R 'logo'. Each action implies an increasing level of organizational effort. We recognize that these actions may be 'symbolic' (without any immediate practical consequences) but, at the same time, we do not consider them to be merely 'cheap talk' because they entail some kind of commitment with the values implicit in the CC and, therefore, a reputational risk in case of clear contradiction. As Brunsson and Jacobsson (2000b, p. 129) put it, 'Whatever strategy is chosen, the adopter of the standards will be open to criticism by others who have a different opinion on whether existing practice conforms to the standards'.

Was incorporating the CC a part of on-going national or institutional reforms (for example, the internationalization or modernization agenda)? Or was there something unique or appealing about the CC that attracted the participation of the organizations in the HRS4R process? For those organizations engaged in the HRS4R process, what accounts for the difference between those achieving 'logo' status and those that still have not? Addressing these questions will shed light on the relationship between non-binding EU recommendations and organizational decisions to comply. To do so, we turn to the literature on compliance to identify potential explanations as to why institutions comply with adopted EU instruments.

### **Soft policy instruments: why comply?**

Studies of European public administration have shown a great interest in compliance and implementation of policies adopted at the supranational level (for reviews see Angelova et al. 2012; Mastenbroek 2005; Treib 2008). The basic assumption is that for integration to ‘work’, adopted EU measures should be ‘evenly’ in place throughout its member states. Most compliance studies concentrate on the transposition of *binding* EU legislation such as directives. In their review, Angelova et al. (2012, p. 1274) distinguish several explanatory arguments in the literature of which four are of particular relevance for the study of voluntary compliance. These are: ‘goodness-of-fit’, ‘enforcement’, ‘culture’ and ‘management’. We consider how these respective explanations help us address the questions raised above concerning three specific instances of voluntary compliance with the CC: endorsement, participation in the HRS4R and obtaining the HRS4R ‘logo’.

The ‘goodness-of-fit’ explanation is the most straightforward and, according to Angelova et al. (2012), supposedly one of the most ‘robust’ of all compliance theses. The basic argument is that, the greater the difference between the status quo of domestic regime or policy and the one introduced at the supranational level, the more likely that non-compliance would be observed. Here, the ‘goodness-of-fit’ is operationalized in different ways such as financial costs associated with transposition (Falkner et al. 2005) and national legislative legacy (Duina and Blithe 1999). However, the simple notion that national (institutional) regimes that are already a ‘good fit’ with the EU’s may account for how and why certain institutions endorse the CC and advance more quickly than others in their implementation, is problematic. First, the ‘goodness-of-fit’ model has been criticized for failing to capture non-compliance even when there is a

recognizable ‘good fit’ (Mastenbroek and Kaeding 2006). Second, the ‘fit’ thesis is known for its elasticity and general lack of specification: it does not isolate which mechanisms cause compliance; for example, is it because ‘fit’ reduces the organizational costs of compliance or is it because it refers to the ‘fit’ between the implementers’ beliefs and the regulation’s embodied values? Therefore, to some extent the ‘fit’ argument is implied in the other explanatory arguments discussed below.

The ‘enforcement’ thesis relies on the ‘logic of expected consequences’ (March and Olsen 1984) where compliance depends on the balance between associated costs and benefits that participating actors anticipate in return (Downs et al. 1996; Tallberg 2002). Other strands of the literature also stress the role of ‘expected consequences’ – for example Brunsson and Jacobsson (2000b, pp. 133–137) underline the importance of ‘situation’ and ‘incentives’ in following standards and Börzel and Risse (2012, p. 11) point to ‘domestic incentives’ when discussing differential empowerment of actors – but it is conceptualized in terms of scope conditions rather than mechanisms. According to the enforcement mechanism, actors are more likely to comply if the costs of non-compliance are higher than compliance. Here, sanctioning, or the infringement procedures initiated by the European Commission, is important for ensuring compliance. While the most ‘rational’ of all compliance theses (Perkins and Neumayer 2007; Thomson 2010; Thomson et al. 2007), this mechanism does not allow us to account for how and why institutions decide to endorse and participate in the CC implementation since there are no visible EU sanctioning systems in place. However, it can be useful to explain continual institutional participation in the translation process (HRS4R) if there is a critical mass that allows the European Commission to leverage informal coercion. For example, it can put up a scoreboard comparing institutional

performance ('logo' vs 'laggards' – the mechanisms of 'naming', 'shaming' and 'faming') or establish endorsement as a condition for accessing European funding programmes.

The 'culture' thesis stems from constructivist scholarship and sociological institutionalism where compliance to an adopted measure is the outcome of the 'right thing to do' (Checkel 2005). Here, compliance would result from actors behaving according to the 'logic of appropriateness' (March and Olsen 1984), grounded in previous organizational identities (Brunsson and Jacobsson 2000b, pp. 131–133) affecting substantive or procedural (that is, imitation, innovation) values; or resulting from extensive interactions amongst actors over a long period of time (to develop trust, learning and, ultimately, modifying identities through socialization processes) (Berglund et al. 2006). In the case of endorsing and translating the CC, we anticipate this mechanism to be working prominently at the endorsement stage and very early on in the HRS4R process because of the relatively low 'cost' associated with these steps. However, as implementation progresses, it is more likely that the 'culture' thesis would only account for the participation of those institutions that perceive compliance as a 'normative commitment'.

The 'management' explanation refers to the dependence of compliance on organizational and institutional capacities more than in sanction mechanisms. The basic assumption is that compliance would be associated with the presence of technical and bureaucratic capabilities, as well as economic resources (Chayes and Handler Chayes 1993). The idea is, as Gornitzka et al. (2007, p. 205) put it, 'If administrative capacity is built up around European standards the national take up of European standards will be easier'. There are also other structural factors affecting compliance capacities, such as

institutional veto players, the degree of decision-making centralization, or the existence of intergovernmental or interdepartmental structures of cooperation. In their ‘robustness’ survey, Angelova et al. (2012, p. 1276) found that ‘institutional decision-making constraints’ to be the other more robust compliance findings. In this respect, the focus is often placed on accounting for non-compliance; for example, active opposition, rivalries between sectors and ministries, or misinterpretation of the adopted EU measure (Falkner et al. 2005, pp. 24–25). In our study, we assume that strong administrative capacity (either at the organizational or system level) is essential for endorsing and implementing the CC, but it is likely to be more crucial for effectively participating in the HRS4R due to the resources that need to be allocated for these activities.

In sum, following earlier compliance studies (Börzel 2010; Börzel et al. 2012; Falkner et al. 2007; Mbaye 2001; Tallberg 2002; Toshkov 2008), we investigate the complementarity between the four explanations in accounting for how and why the institutions endorse, implement the CC and seek to achieve the HRS4R ‘logo’. We expect these four theses to be invoked by participants to explain their decisions and our aim is to identify the potential links between them. In the following section we present the research design and the empirical results.

### **Translating the Charter and the Code in national arenas: Norway vs Spain**

To our knowledge, there are no existing studies about research organizations voluntarily implementing the CC. Consequently, our research design adopts the form of an exploratory comparative case study (Yin 2009, p. 29). As stated above, we focus on the initial stage of the implementation process – where the principles of the CC are ‘translated’ into rules at the domestic level (through changes in legal, policy or

organizational regulations). More specifically, our targets (the explananda) are three specific moments of the ‘translation’ process – each of them involving increasing resource investment by participant organizations: formal endorsement of the CC, participation in the HRS4R and receiving the ‘logo’. Therefore, we do not deal with other stages of implementation such as enforcement by policy or organizational authorities or their application on the ground.

We restricted the analysis mainly to the first cohort of the HRS4R, as it was the only group operational at the start of this study (late 2010) and, as pioneers, they could be seen as ‘innovators’ amongst their peers (‘imitators’). It is therefore important to identify the mechanisms that triggered their decision to endorse the CC, participate in the HRS4R and obtain the ‘logo’. References to other cohorts are used to compare and contrast findings concerning the pilot group and to point out areas for future research. Cohort 1 initially comprised of 41 institutions, but a few left to join the second cohort and three interest groups were invited to participate as ‘multipliers’ (participant observation 2010). As of 2013, more than half are ‘acknowledged’: they have reached the third stage of the HRS4R and achieved ‘logo’ status (see Table 3.3).

[Table 3.3 about here]

Concerning the countries, we selected them according to the ‘most-different’ criterion, focusing on the success rate of obtaining the ‘logo’. We retained the country distinction rather than the characteristics of the organizations (for example, small vs large; higher education institutions vs funding bodies) because the members of the first cohort were organized by country. Here, the countries could be divided into at least four

groups according to the success criteria, ranging from very successful where all institutions were acknowledged, to those less successful where one or none had secured the logo. We were interested in the very successful and the least successful and we wanted our cases to have more than one participating institution with at least one acknowledged institution since this mix allowed us to compare the country cases. Based on these criteria, we had four potential countries: Norway and Slovenia (highly successful); France and Spain (less successful).

We decided to focus on Norway and Spain because they represented two extreme country cases; respectively, for example, financially well-endowed vs crisis-stricken; non-EU member vs an old member; centralized vs decentralized research systems; authorities enthusiastic vs those hesitant to embrace the CC. Moreover, these two countries represented very different compliance models, with the Norwegians following a more consensus-seeking and dialogic model (Sverdrup 2004) and the Spanish following a monitoring model where compliance relies more on follow-up enforcement. If we identified the same mechanisms to be responsible, the findings would be significant in the current context because they would signal that legally-binding measures may not be essential for further integration even at times of economic crisis.

We applied three different methods: documentary analysis of official EU texts and institutional gap analyses; semi-structured and confidential interviews with HR personnel overseeing the implementation process, officials from relevant ministries and those who were involved in promoting the CC nationally; and participant observation (one of the authors was a member of the HRS4R pilot group and participant observation is used to complement documentary and interview data). We carried out a total of 40

interviews (14 in Norway and 26 in Spain) between December 2010 and November 2012. The interviews were used to identify the following information: general awareness of the CC and the principles it promoted ('fit' with institutional and domestic policies); institutional motivation for endorsing the CC (material incentives vs values/norms embedded in organizational history, policies and practices); and organizational capacity and leadership for promoting the CC. To reference the interviews, we developed a coding system with 'NO' referring to Norwegian interviewees and 'ES' to Spanish interviewees. Since the interviews were carried out under conditions of anonymity, we provide only the institutional affiliation of the speakers in the text along with the date of the interview.

To start with we provide a description of the CC promotion process in the two countries prior to the launch of the HRS4R. We then identify the motivations of the respective institutions to endorse the CC and to participate in the HRS4R process.

### Promoting the Charter and the Code

#### *Norway*

Norway has been a champion of the CC from the very beginning. Shortly after the European Commission adopted the CC in 2005, the Research Council of Norway started to promote these principles nationally; prior to the 2005 Bologna ministerial meeting at Bergen, according to an interviewee from the University of Bergen (INTVNO9, 22 February 2012), it informed all Norwegian higher education and research institutions about the CC. Offering its support, in December 2005 the Ministry of Education and Research requested the Association of Higher Education Institutions (Universitets- og Høgskolerådet, UHR) to evaluate the impact that the CC may have on the Norwegian

higher education and research system. This assessment was not carried out, however, until 2008.

We asked several interviewees to explain this delay. According to an interviewee from the UHR, when requesting further instruction from the Research Council, the instructions offered were 'quite vague'; the UHR was told that it 'should look into it' (INTVNO1, 1 February 2012). Providing another perspective, a University of Bergen interviewee said that, actually, 'The UHR problematized it a lot, [they stated that] we don't need to sign it, we have already implemented it' (INTVNO9). An interviewee from the Researchers' Union (Forskerforbundet) supported this view, 'What happened when it came and was presented in Norway, [the] reaction from many universities for example was that this is nothing new. This is how we do it in Norway' (INTVNO14, 2 March 2012). An official from the Research Council explained that the hesitance was very natural since 'This is something coming from outside. What does this really mean? Do we have to? What can we get from it?' (INTVNO2, 2 February 2012). What we may conclude is that, although there was a clear 'fit' between Norwegian regulation and the principles promoted by the CC, there was hesitance to embrace them. Interestingly, this very 'fit' was also used to argue *against* further commitment from Norwegian institutions at that time.

To signal its unambiguous support for the CC, the Research Council organized a formal endorsement ceremony at Copenhagen on 17 October 2006. In the presence of the Norwegian Minister of Education and Research and the European Commissioner for Research, the Research Council's Director General signed the CC on behalf of Norway. When asked to elaborate on what this 'formal signing' meant, an interviewee from the Research Council explained that 'it gives some sign that this is important' (INTVNO2).

At the same time, this interviewee qualified the signing as a ‘gimmick’ because its aim was to generate ‘attention nationally’ (INTVNO2). It worked; on 6 February 2007, the UHR formally signed the CC and appointed a committee to examine how the CC ‘could best be implemented at Norwegian universities and university colleges’ (UHR 2008). The Committee’s report, completed in August 2008, became the national gap analysis and would prove to be crucial in the widespread acceptance of the CC amongst Norwegian institutions – especially those lacking resources to carry out their institutional gap analysis.

The Norwegian gap analysis found that in the main its national regulations were in line with the CC principles. The Committee, however, isolated eight principles that could be problematic when directly implemented because of its ambiguous formulation (for example, the ‘research environment’ principle), existing schemes (the ‘professional recognition’ principle would be challenging for maintaining the Norwegian ‘quota scheme’ for Ph.D. since they have student status), or a general lack of a viable pan-European solution (pension portability) (UHR 2008). Two principles stood out for being very difficult to enforce: introducing an evaluation/appraisal system at the level of individual researchers (‘career counselling’) and providing unsuccessful applicants with feedback on their weaknesses and strengths. The Committee argued that implementing these principles would be time-consuming and costly; some of the processes may be too sensitive and ‘must be handled with discretion’ (ibid.).

The UHR and the Research Council jointly launched the national gap analysis in January 2009 at a seminar on the topic of ‘Global competition for Talented Researchers’ according to our interviewee in the Research Council (INTVNO2). The CC was presented as a tool to ‘clarify and simplify recruitment and funding processes’ so that

Norway can ‘successfully compete for the best international researchers’ (Euraxess 2009). At that meeting, the Minister of Education and Research also politically supported the CC translation and the Norwegian internal HRS4R group met for the first time. This ‘national group’, according to its designer in the Research Council, ‘was something we thought of even before the HR Strategy group on the EU level’ (INTVNO2). The idea was to enable informal dialogue amongst Norwegian universities on ‘Recruitment [and] how to build that good research environment’; the group has now expanded to include university colleges and industrial partners (INTVNO2). What we may conclude is that complying with the CC – voluntarily, but visibly – was important to Norwegian political actors who actively promoted these principles and steered the process from top-down. As we shall now discuss, it was an entirely different process in Spain.

### *Spain*

An EU member since 1986, decentralization is a basic feature of the Spanish research system. The state and the autonomous regions are both constitutionally entitled to develop their own policies and institutional structures, but they share authority on regulating universities. The regions are responsible for funding universities while the federal government is tasked with coordinating the entire system through the National Plan of Research, Development and Innovation – a tool criticized for being ineffective (Sanz 1997; Tortosa 2006). HR policy in research is regulated in two ways: by the civil service code or through employer administrative or labour contracts, which include pre- and postdoctoral grants. During the 2000s, research grant holders launched a campaign to improve the precarious working conditions of contract researchers. Organized as the

Young Researchers Federation (FJI), these stakeholders were involved in drafting the CC through the institutional framework of the European Council of Doctoral Candidates (Eurodoc); the European Commission invited Eurodoc to participate and a FJI member was its delegate. In this way, the FJI can be considered as the main CC champion in Spain.

When the CC was adopted in 2005, the Ministry of Education and Science was studying how to change postdoctoral grants into labour contracts and replace doctoral grants with a '2+2' system. The resulting regulation adopted in January 2006 – *Estatuto del personal investigador en formación* – allegedly implemented the CC principles. The subsequent calls issued under the National Plan did indeed mention the CC, but we have observed that the programmes funded or managed by the research centres dependent on these funding schemes did not reference the CC in their calls.

In 2008, the Ministry of Science and Innovation and the Council of Universities jointly committed to promote the CC implementation. In a report issued in September 2008, the Council of Universities declared that 'in view of the importance of the decision' it will 'study [the CC], promote its application and identify those problems and obstacles that could hinder its implementation, undertaking initiatives to solve them' (Consejo de Universidades 2008). To that end, the report confirmed that the Council would create an 'organizational node' within its secretariat (dependent on the Ministry of Science and Innovation). According to the then General Secretary of the Council, however, such a node was never created (INTVES9, 25 February 2011). The promotion of the CC in Spain occurred primarily through the Euraxess network and indirectly via the promotion of Marie Curie Co-Fund programmes (Ministry of Science and Innovation 2011).

The Spanish Law on Science, Technology and Innovation adopted in May 2011 cited the CC as inspiring the new regulatory framework concerning research personnel. Speaking with the General Director of Research in office when the bill was sent to Parliament, we were told that the law is fully compliant with the CC (INTVES6, 26 January 2011). Specifically, our attention was drawn to the section on the rights and duties of research personnel and the introduction of a four-year employment contract (replacing the '2+2' regime). The latter was, however, not in the original text; it was only introduced during Parliamentary debates. To summarize, the promotion of the CC in Spain started as a bottom-up process to reform the working conditions of researchers; the Ministry attempted to steer this process by referencing the CC as inspiring national reforms and closer examination has shown that follow-up activities have not been fully realized. To what extent have the different promotional strategies affected the patterns of the CC endorsement and translation in these two countries?

#### Endorsing the Charter and the Code

As of January 2013, 18 Norwegian institutions have formally endorsed the CC. Amongst these organizations, higher education institutions constitute the majority and, together, they account for 76 per cent of all research and academic staff working in the higher education sector in 2011 (Statistics Norway 2013). In the case of Norway, we detected three distinct waves of endorsement: *pre-2009* (pioneer institutions); *post-January 2009* (after publication of the national gap analysis); and *post-2011* (when the second, third and fourth HRS4R cohorts convened). Their motivations for endorsing the CC were as follows. For the pioneer institutions, as we shall discuss in detail in the next section, endorsing the CC was part of their individualistic institutional decisions to

participate in the HRS4R; put simply, the CC endorsement was not seen as a separate act to implementing these principles. For most institutions endorsing the CC in 2009, their decisions were attributed to the request that the UHR made in February: it asked the universities and university colleges to sign a 'Declaration of Commitment'. It was successful; as our UHR interviewee puts it, 'The UHR has very good network and links into the administration at major universities and university colleges' and was thus able to galvanize support (INTVNO1). For the post-2011 signatories, their endorsement was a 'prerequisite' to joining the HRS4R process.

There are 46 Spanish institutions that have formally endorsed the CC; after Italy, Spain has the highest number of signatories (10 per cent). At the same time, in contrast to Norway, these organizations account for only 13.5 per cent of all researchers in Spain in 2009 (Eurostat 2013). The Spanish endorsement pattern is as follows: most occurred in 2011 (20); there were 19 endorsements during 2006–2010, with 11 institutions declaring their support in 2008. In terms of their features, the Spanish institutions are a veritable mix: the smallest institution employs 11 researchers while the largest has 7,500 (Highest Council for Scientific Research); two are regional ministries (Madrid and Catalonia); 36 are promoted by public administrations; and the rest are the results of public-private partnerships. There are three common features, however, that are shared by the majority of Spanish institutions: they are financially dependent on the regional governments (24 institutions); they are very young (33 were created in the 2000s, only six before 1990); and they belong to two highly competitive research sectors (25 in biomedical and seven in high-technology research).

According to our Spanish interviewees, they decided to endorse the CC due to one of three following reasons. First, similar to the post-January 2009 Norwegian

endorsers, they endorsed the CC as the result of a formal request from an authority outside of their institution. This was the case for centres associated with the Institute of Health ‘Carlos III’ (nine institutions), Madrid Institute for Advanced Studies (IMDEA) (nine institutions) and those dependent on the Catalan Department of Health (five institutions). Although these organizations relied on the support of the regional ministries issuing the request, not all interpreted the request as a direct imposition. For instance, two centres linked to the Institute of ‘Carlos III’ (on epidemiology and neurodegenerative diseases) have yet to formally endorse at the time of writing.

Second, endorsing the CC was the result of an endogenous process triggered by exogenous factors. According to our interviewees, the most powerful exogenous factor was competition for EU funds: six organizations explicitly mention this as a reason and two cite it as the *only* motivation (the Valencian Institute for Small and Medium Enterprise and the Catalan Agency for Competitiveness). In this respect, EU funding conditions are particularly significant in triggering compliance. We should clarify, however, that this is only linked to the Marie Curie Co-Fund scheme which establishes the CC compliance as a desirable quality institutions could evidence in support of their application (European Commission 2010, p. 17). A total of 19 out of 46 Spanish endorsers are recipients of the Marie Curie Co-Fund, while none of the Norwegian institutions are grantees (European Commission 2013). Another exogenous factor, according to the Deputy General Director of Research from the regional Ministry of Education of Madrid, was the FJI’s campaign supporting the CC implementation (INTVES3, 13 December 2010). We were told that the regional Ministry endorsed the CC as a symbolic gesture to show how they were improving research trainees’ working conditions (INTVES3).

Third, the remaining Spanish institutions decided to endorse the CC as a result of endogenous processes within their organizations. Here, the decision was spearheaded by someone in a (high) decision-making position or within the HR department. We asked our interviewees how they became aware of the CC and were told that most of them found out via contacts from organizations with which they were formally linked (13 interviewees); five interviewees mentioned informal and personal contacts with other signatories. For these institutions, the CC endorsement was a tool to showcase the attractiveness of their HR policy to potential candidates (17 interviewees mentioned this); indeed, 13 interviewees even asserted that the CC principles are the very ones their institutions applied in HR management. Amongst these institutions, it should be noted that eight interviewees also stated that they anticipate the CC endorsement to improve their capacity to compete for EU funding vis-à-vis non-complying institutions.

#### Participating in the HRS4R and achieving the logo

There are 21 Spanish institutions participating in the HRS4R; this means that Spain has the highest participation rate amongst all countries (9.2 per cent of all participants). In terms of organizational characteristics, the HRS4R participating institutions mirror those that have endorsed the Charter and the Code ('a veritable mix'): 12 belong to the biomedical sector and 11 have been awarded a Co-Fund project. Despite this high participation rate, only two Spanish institutions have received the 'HR Excellence in Research' logo at the time of writing: IMDEA Water (cohort 1) and the Basque Foundation for Science (cohort 2). An interviewee from the Institute of Health 'Carlos III' informed us that this institution has also been recognized by the European

Commission in September 2012 and is awaiting formal confirmation when we carried out the interview in November 2012 (INTVES29, 27 November 2012).

According to interviewees from the Spanish HRS4R participant institutions, the decisions to translate the CC were natural ‘follow-ups’ to endorsement. Put simply, after initial decisions to endorse the CC were taken, implementation was merely an extension – ‘continuity’ as an interviewee from IMDEA Water puts it (INTVES4, 17 January 2011) – of the same decisional process. Hence, their rationales for implementation are the same as those for endorsement: nine interviewees cited increased capacity to recruit internationally, while six interviewees referred to the complementarity between their HR policy and the CC principles. Only three interviewees said that they were motivated by the potential to increase their institutional capacity to compete for EU funding.

There are eleven Norwegian organizations participating in the HRS4R process; they are fairly evenly spread across four cohorts (two in the second cohort and three in all the other cohorts). There are five institutions that have received the logo: Norwegian University of Science and Technology (NTNU), University of Oslo, Norwegian Research Council, University of Tromsø and Vestfold University College. As mentioned earlier, this study focuses on the first cohort and the following discussion will revolve around the motivation of NTNU, the Research Council and the University of Oslo to participate in the HRS4R and achieve logo status.

The Research Council of Norway was the first to sign the CC, but it was the last Norwegian institution in the first cohort to be acknowledged – in January 2011 – due to internal approval processes according to our interviewee in the Research Council (INTVNO2). Its motivation to participate in the HRS4R is rooted in the very complex roles that the Research Council plays in carrying forward the domestic policy agenda to

internationalize Norwegian research. As we were repeatedly told by interviewees, for example such as another interviewee in the Research Council, Norway is a small country and its strategy to remain competitive is to internationalize its research (INTVNO7, 8 February 2012). The European arena is *the* gateway for this purpose: ‘Participation in the EU Framework Programmes for research is essential as an instrument for the internationalization of Norwegian research’ (St. meld. nr. 30 2009, p. 109). A major funder of research in Norway, the Research Council is also the Norwegian delegate to the EU in the research policy domain. It acknowledges this complexity in its gap analysis: the Research Council has ‘three roles in relation to the Charter and Code’ – ‘a funder, employer and advisor’ (Research Council of Norway 2010). More specifically, its ‘advisory function will entail pointing out deficiencies and challenges that need to be solved outside the Research Council’ (ibid.).

We asked interviewees to explain why the Research Council has a role that one would usually expect the ministry to play in other countries. Most interviewees, such as the speaker from the Ministry of Research, referred to Norway’s special relationship with the EU as a starting point (INTVNO4, 6 February 2012). Having twice rejected membership, its dealings with the supranational entity are politically sensitive; Norwegian policy-makers have sought to manage this relationship through the very complex institutional infrastructure erected by the European Economic Area (EEA) agreement (Chou and Gornitzka 2011). The Research Council, officially an independent agency, is given the tasks to represent Norway, alongside ministry officials, in various European research policy committees and to ensure that national institutions are fully informed of the most recent developments. Hence, its full participation in the HRS4R

process also signals the political attention and seriousness that Norway devotes to EU research policy cooperation – even for voluntary measures.

The NTNU, the largest university in the country, was the third to endorse the CC and the first Norwegian organization to receive the logo in February 2010. According to the senior adviser in the HR department (INTVNO13, 29 February 2012) and its official report (NTNU 2010), it was motivated to participate in the HRS4R for two interlinking reasons: to attract international staff (33 per cent of Ph.D. and 25 per cent of researchers are non-Norwegians) and to use the CC as a tool for promoting its reputation amongst target recruits. An interviewee from the NTNU explained that the CC has been implemented ‘as a bureaucratic exercise, to fulfil our requirements externally’ and has not been ‘used as an instrument for change as such’ (INTVNO13). This is because of the ‘administrative boundary-crossing’ nature of the CC principles. As this interviewee put it: ‘I’ve found it difficult to get attention to the Charter and Code at the bigger universities like ours. What’s given attention are projects [for example quality development, well running receptions, service for international researchers], not the Charter and Code’ (ibid.).

The University of Oslo, the oldest university in the country, was the second to obtain the logo in June 2010. According to interviewees in the HR department (INTVNO3, 3 February 2012; INTVNO5, INTVNO6, 6 February 2012), it was a ‘lucky’ coincidence that the momentum for translating the CC gathered in 2009 when the University of Oslo began an internal university-wide revision of the ten-years strategy. Participating in the HRS4R and implementing the CC principles were therefore considered primarily in light of how they may contribute to achieving the ambitions of the university. While interviewees at NTNU (INTVNO11, 23 February 2012) and the

University of Oslo pointed to the ‘ease’ of accepting the CC principles due to existing Norwegian law, an HR official from the University of Oslo emphasized that this institution was attracted to the CC because it was sold as a tool for enabling researcher mobility and internationalization (INTVNO3). This interviewee explained how this became problematic during translation when it was not obvious how the CC contributed to encouraging Norwegian researchers to go abroad and to attracting foreign researchers when national regulations were at an equivalent, if not higher, standard (ibid.). In the next section, we offer a more systematic interpretation of the empirical findings and show how they support the different explanations highlighted in the compliance literature.

### **Accounting for variation in endorsing and translating the CC**

To offer a more structured explanation, we will consider the rationale behind compliance and the institutional conditions under which organizations decide to endorse the CC and proceed with its translation. Here, rationale refers to the logics behind voluntary compliance – the logic of expected consequences and the logic of appropriateness (March and Olsen 1984). In terms of the explanations discussed earlier, these logics point to the ‘enforcement’ and ‘culture’ mechanisms, but, as we shall show, the logic of appropriateness reveals aspects of the enforcement mechanism than are implied in compliance studies. The institutional conditions relate to the account based on a ‘management’ approach, which emphasizes organizational structures in inducing and ensuring compliance.

### The logics at work

Our findings reveal that both logics (the logic of expected consequences and the logic of appropriateness) have a place in accounting for institutional decisions to endorse and implement the CC in Norway and Spain. The logic of expected consequences – or anticipated future returns – is observed in cases where the institutional decisions to endorse and translate are made following that institution's positive evaluation of the CC. In Norway, the national gap analysis has greatly facilitated this calculation by demonstrating how existing laws and regulations already uphold the CC principles. In this way, Norwegian institutions in the first cohort were able to concentrate on analysing the benefits that translating the CC principles would bring; both the NTNU and the University of Oslo saw the CC as an instrument to raise their respective international profiles. This was also the case for the Spanish institutions; interviewees from nine HRS4R participant institutions pointed out that endorsing and implementing the CC contributes to the same goal.

Compliance, most interestingly, does not depend on direct negative institutional incentives. Our findings show that, in line with the enforcement thesis, it is feasible to trigger compliance by means of indirect institutional incentives such as introducing endorsement as a 'merit' for accessing EU research funds. This was the case for many Spanish institutions we studied; indeed, 41 per cent of these institutions were hosts of EU Marie Curie Co-Fund projects which consider the CC compliance as a positive feature of applicant institutions. While none of the Norwegian institutions we examined were Co-Fund recipients, the Research Council has started to insert the CC references into funding calls to 'stimulate research institutions to implement measures that improve

working conditions and career opportunities for researchers' (Research Council of Norway 2010).

What we have observed in many instances is an alignment of both logics, where the logic of appropriateness reinforces the logic of expected consequences. For instance, in Norway we were told by an interviewee from the University of Bergen who was involved in disseminating the CC in Norway that promoting the translation of the CC principles was 'solidarity work with the rest of Europe. We had secured social rights and rights for the students in Norway, why shouldn't we support the Ph.D. students in Germany, in Spain, in Italy, in England?' (INTVNO9). The overall sentiment is that Norway is a case of 'best practice' and therefore it should actively lead the process of endorsing and implementing the CC. This goes hand-in-hand with the consequentialist goal of raising institutional profiles and the strategy cultivated in the Norwegian system to internationalize national research through the EU framework. The convergence of both logics is also evident in Spain. In ten institutions, interviewees told us that complying with the CC was coherent with their organizational history and beliefs in human resource management while contributing to achieving their strategic goals such as increasing international competitiveness.

The non-convergence and co-presence of the two logics, quite interestingly, can help us shed light on non-endorsement. In principle, endorsing the CC should imply 'net gain' – all the advantages of branding without further costs – for signatories. This is due to the lack of an enforcement regime for penalizing violators. It follows that one would expect this cost-benefit outcome to resonate with a consequentialist logic which, in turn, would encourage institutions to endorse. Yet we know that only *four* out of 48 Spanish public universities have endorsed the CC; uncovering factors leading to this would show

another way that ‘cost’ is measured. The Spanish Council of Universities, as discussed earlier, has yet to establish a unit within its secretariat to coordinate the CC promotion and compliance. The reason for this, in addition to the administrative capacity issue discussed below, is because some of the CC principles are in direct conflict with the HR policies in most Spanish universities. According to Fernández Esquinas et al. (2006), this includes lack of transparency and prevalence of non-merit criteria in the recruitment process. Similarly, the 2009 ERAWATCH report for Spain explicitly links low levels of the CC endorsement with the predominant selection practice in most research institutions (Heijs 2010, p. 30).

For these Spanish institutions, endorsing the CC is costly not because it directly and immediately entails adjusting to the CC principles; it is costly because the CC endorsement is a potential source of internal conflict. The HR practices at most Spanish universities are results of a historical process in configuring Spanish research and academic systems; they are reproduced by current incentives and governance structures. When the CC was adopted in 2005, the FJI immediately seized these principles and transformed them into a powerful ‘dialectical weapon’ to extract social security benefits and labour contracts for pre- and postdoctoral researchers (Real-Dato 2012). The gradual reforms in the last decade resulting in the abolition of grants without social security rights testify to their success. It is hardly surprising that few Spanish universities have endorsed the CC. For them, endorsing is inappropriate; the wrong thing to do. This is a crucial insight because it points to how powerful the perception of appropriateness is in determining behaviour even when symbolic, albeit formal, support could generate reputational benefits. As we shall now discuss, this was a non-starter for many when combined with low institutional capacity to manage the CC translation.

### Institutional context and organizational capacities

Our findings point to the importance of the institutional conditions in explaining variance in endorsement and implementation patterns amongst Norwegian and Spanish institutions. At the systemic level, the institutionalized pattern of cooperation between the Norwegian Ministry of Education and Research, the Research Council and the UHR has been crucial in forming a consensus regarding the CC endorsement and translation. This consensus is manifested in the production and dissemination of a national gap analysis and the creation and continual operation of a national HR Strategy Group. We asked an interviewee in the Research Council to account for the overall success and quick uptake of the CC and was told that ‘maybe part of this is that we do have this close relationship with the ministry...we have this support, the political support is in place and I think that’s important for a country to have that’ (INTVNO7). This is an interesting insight for compliance studies: active support and close collaboration between institutions and the ministry encourage compliance with non-binding measures.

The decentralized set-up of the Spanish political system and the autonomy that the state and regions have in regulating this policy domain explain the CC endorsement and translation pattern in this country. Only one Spanish institution amongst our interview sample confirmed that they became aware of the CC through the national government despite federal efforts to promote these principles. According to the General Director of Research at the Ministry of Science and Innovation during 2008–2010, the CC was not considered ‘a key paradigm for defining the research career framework’ in Spain, it is ‘just one reference among others’ (INTVES6). The regional governments appear to share this attitude: only two (out of 17) are participating in the HRS4R. Although the 2009 Law of the Valencian Research and Development system

has explicitly committed to applying the CC, no implementation measures have been taken as of time of writing. For compliance studies, the Spanish case offers this insight: active opposition is unnecessary to block compliance to voluntary measures; lack of enthusiasm is sufficient.

Turning to the individual institutions, we find that strong leadership in favour of the CC implementation was constant in all Norwegian and Spanish institutions participating in the HRS4R. While this is hardly surprising, it is remarkable that in the Spanish case this feature is found amongst research institutions with a particular structure: foundation created by the public administration. Hence, in terms of human resource management and their internal structure, these institutions could act as private entities with flexible regulations than those applied to public administration institutions such as universities.

## **Conclusions**

In this chapter, we set out to explain why national actors voluntarily comply with EU measures that may seek to change existing procedures, rules and practice. The case study offers interesting insights on this subject. Norwegian and Spanish institutions comply with ‘The European Charter for Researchers and the Code of Conduct for the Recruitment of Researchers’ for overlapping reasons. On the one hand, in line with a consequential logic, the formal endorsement of the CC and its translation depended on the extent to which institutional decision-makers perceived these activities as a source of immediate or future benefits – in political, reputational and/or financial terms. On the other hand, according to the logic of appropriateness, when the CC principles resonated with the organization’s identity (beliefs, underlying histories, policies and practices), the

more the institutions actively engaged in their translation. Conversely, when the CC was in conflict with these organizational aspects, the more reluctant the institutions were with formal endorsement, let alone actual translation, even when this symbolic gesture was very likely to produce reputational benefits. In addition, we also saw that the activation of the logics or the final realization of the intentions relied on the institutional context (such as the existence of institutionalized coordination/communication patterns between potential adopters) and internal capacities (regulatory autonomy, leadership, resources); these are key mediating factors in voluntary compliance.

The CC case also suggests that standards do have a role to play as tools in the European integration process, which has long been depicted as one that follows organizational and procedural hierarchy, and is characterized as ‘integration by law’. The voluntary feature of the CC has managed to stimulate compliance by national funding agencies, universities and research institutes and, consequently, has positively contributed to the politically set goal of constructing a Europe of Knowledge. Yet, beyond this, the role of standards is also rather ambiguous. For instance, the European Commission only launched the HRS4R to assist national organizations in translating the CC when there was insufficient interest amongst governmental actors – the primary audience as originally stated in the CC – to do so. This can be interpreted as the European Commission’s failure to promote the translation of the CC in the traditional (that is, ‘hierarchical’) manner: from the EU executive to the member states. However, it can also be interpreted as a sign of the ‘flexibility’ that standards as a policy tool offers to the European Commission – standards allow standardizers to use a variety of additional instruments to promote voluntary compliance without losing their non-

binding character. Therefore, the 'roles' standards play in the integration process very much depend on how they are instrumentalized and *re*instrumentalized.

This study shows that, in general, regulating through standards allows for a seemingly continual exploration of the regulatory boundaries of what is acceptable that follows a different pattern than the one associated with 'hard law'. The standardization process enables new alliances to form/reform without repeating the identifiable steps of the legislative process associated with legal integration. This approach may appear to be more conducive for addressing issues or areas where there are numerous dimensions of contention and questions of autonomy or 'regulatory ownership'. At the same time, this study also reveals that new expectations emerge from this process and on which the future operation of this voluntary mechanism may hang, that could be challenging for the standardizer to meet. For instance, would the European Commission be able to reform the EU funding programmes to offer more favourable treatments for those organizations that have achieved 'logo' status? If not, what would be the European value-added for 'logo' recipients when these organizations have completed the translation process? While we have an improved understanding of why some national actors comply with voluntary EU measures, the sustainability of these developments remains an open question.

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**Table 3.1 The European Charter for Researchers**

General principles and requirements applicable to researchers	General principles and requirements applicable to employers and funders
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>–Research freedom (but admitting limitations given particular research circumstances, operational constraints or intellectual property issues)</li> <li>–Adherence to ethical principles in the discipline</li> <li>–Professional responsibility (avoiding duplications, plagiarism and so on)</li> <li>–Professional attitude</li> <li>–Comply with contractual and legal obligations</li> <li>–Accountability towards employers, funders and society</li> <li>–Keeping good practices in research (safe data management and protection, workplace safety)</li> <li>–Dissemination and exploitation of results</li> <li>–Public engagement (research activity and results should be made accessible to non-specialists)</li> <li>–Regular and structured relationship between research trainees and supervisors</li> <li>–Performing supervision and managerial duties to the highest professional standards</li> <li>–Continuous professional updating and development</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>–Recognition of all researchers (including early-stage ones) as professionals</li> <li>–Non-discrimination on whichever basis</li> <li>–Ensuring an stimulating and safe research environment</li> <li>–Ensuring flexible working conditions in accordance with national regulations which allow combine family, work and career</li> <li>–Promoting contractual stability</li> <li>–Ensuring attractive funding conditions and salaries with equitable social security provisions</li> <li>–Keeping gender balance at all levels</li> <li>–Drawing up a specific career development strategy</li> <li>–Recognition of the value of geographical, intersectoral, trans-disciplinary and virtual mobility</li> <li>–Ensuring researchers’ access to research training and continuous development</li> <li>–Ensuring access to career advice and job placement assistance</li> <li>–Ensuring appropriate protection of intellectual property rights</li> <li>–Positive valuation and recognition of co-authorship</li> <li>–Ensuring competent supervision of early-stage researchers</li> <li>–Considering teaching as an option in researchers’ career paths and ensuring it does not interfere with research activities</li> <li>–Introducing transparent and periodical evaluation/appraisal systems for all researchers</li> <li>–Establishing appropriate procedures to deal with complaint/appeals of researchers</li> <li>–Ensuring clear recruitment standards, facilitating the (re)entry in the research career to disadvantaged groups and returning researchers</li> </ul>

Source: Commission (2005).

**Table 3.2 The European Code of Conduct for Researcher Recruitment**

Principle	Content
Recruitment	Recruitment procedures should be open, efficient, transparent, supportive, internationally comparable and tailored to the type of position advertised
Advertisements*	They should include broad descriptions of knowledge and competencies required, working conditions and entitlements, career development prospects, and realistic time between advertisement and deadline of proposals
Selection	Committees should bring together expertise, adequate gender balance, and sectoral and disciplinary diversity. A variety of selection practices should be used
Transparency	Candidates should be informed about the recruitment process, selection criteria, number of available positions, career prospects, as well as the strengths and weaknesses of their applications after the selection
Judging merit	Selection should consider the whole range of experience of the candidates, their creativity and level of independence, and merits should be judged both on a quantitative and qualitative basis
Chronological order of CVs	Career breaks or variations in chronological order should be regarded as an evolution of a career, and thus, be evaluable as a contribution to professional development
Recognition of mobility experience	Geographical, sectoral, discipline or virtual should be considered as a valuable contribution to professional development
Recognition of qualifications	An appropriate assessment and evaluation of academic and professional, formal and non-formal, qualifications should be provided
Seniority	Qualifications required should be in line with the needs of the position, and recognition and evaluation should focus on judging achievements along a lifelong professional development rather than circumstances or the reputation of the institution where the qualifications were gained
Postdoctoral appointments	Rules and guidelines should be explicit for the recruitment and appointment of postdoctoral researchers. These should be take into account that postdoctoral status should be transitional and oriented to provide additional professional development opportunities

*Note:* \* This is not a separate principle in the Code, but given its importance, we consider it as such.

*Source:* Commission (2005).

**Table 3.3 HRS4R Pilot Group**

Country	Organization	#
Austria	Medical University of Graz*	1
Belgium	Fonds de la Recherche Scientifique	2
	University of Hasselt	3
	Flemish Research Foundation*	4
Croatia	University of Rijeka*	5
	Agency for Mobility and EU Programmes	6
France	University of Compiègne	7
	INRA*	8
	Institut Pasteur	9
	University of Lille	10
	Université Pierre et Marie Curie	11
Germany	EMBL	12
	University of Heidelberg	13
Greece	Centre for Research and Technology Hellas	14
	National Hellenic Research Foundation	15
Hungary	Eötvös Loránd University	16
Iceland	University of Reykjavik*	17
Israel	Technion – Israel Institute of Technology	18
Italy	University of Padova	19
	University of Foggia*	20
	University of Palermo*	21
	University of Udine	22
	University of Camerino*	23
Luxembourg	CRP Santé*	24
	Fonds National de la Recherche Luxembourg	25
Norway	Research Council of Norway*	26
	Norwegian Technical University, NTNU*	27
	University of Oslo*	28
Slovenia	University of Maribor*	29
	University of Primorska*	30
Spain	Agencia de Gestió d’Ajuts Universitaris i de Recerca (AGAUR)	31
	IDIBELL	32
	IMDEA Water*	33
Switzerland	CERN	34
	University of applied sciences, Berne*	35
	ETH Zurich	36
	Swiss Rectors Conference CRUS	37
UK <sup>^</sup>	British Council (Science)	38
	University of Bristol*	39
	VITAE	40
	University of Cambridge*	41

Notes: <sup>^</sup> UK organizations are following Concordat; \* Acknowledged ‘HR Excellence in Research’ organizations amongst the first cohort.

Source: authors’ own compilation; some participants have left the pilot group and joined other cohorts.